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ABSTRACT 
The underground economy is a matter of interest and a common challenge for countries. 
Tackling shadow economy problem is essential since it means losing a valuable source of 
revenue which has undoubtedly direct implications for the overall society. Given the 
importance and disparities of shadow economy in the 28 European Union countries, the 
purpose of this paper is to analyze deeply the shadow economy and its main determinants 
exclusively on the EU. To conduct the investigation, a database has been constructed for the 
period 2000-2015, with a particular focus on taxation, employment rates, governance quality 
and macroeconomic variables. Econometric estimations with panel data have been made. 
The empirical analysis suggests important results on the effect of some drivers on shadow 
economy, such as the remarkable negative influence of high tax burden on shadow economy. 
Results might shed light on ways to combat shadow economy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, shadow economy is a matter of interest which frequently causes trouble to 
governments. Indeed, shadow economy is one of the most prevalent and most damaging 
forms of losing revenue that the State has to deal with. In the last decades, the fight against 
tax evasion, the underground economy and informal jobs have become significant policy 
priorities in the European Union countries.  
While most recent researches agree that shadow economy has declined across European 
Union countries in the last years, there is plenty of evidence to confirm that this phenomenon 
is still of high importance. The estimated size of the shadow economy in several European 
Union countries is reasonably large, although it is true that estimates of its size in the EU 
vary significantly from under 8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in some countries to 
over 36% in others. Throughout this paper, we hope to find an explanation to this great 
discrepancy. 
As it has been mentioned, shadow economy activities have direct implications that must be 
taken seriously into consideration, it is therefore crucial to be aware of them. To start with, 
undeclared economic activities have a detrimental impact on tax collection, severely 
undermining the objective of budgetary stability and rising the distorting effects of the tax 
system (Fernández et al., 2018). As a result, public revenue and public services are logically 
weakened. On the other hand, informal employment is usually less secure, worst-paid and 
characterized by weaker working conditions  (Willians & Horodnic, 2015). In addition, firms 
staying informal are usually less productive and innovative, affecting negatively country’s 
human capital and technological innovations. 
Now, it might be appropriate to justify the usefulness of this study. Although the research 
of shadow economy and its determinants has improved over the last years, to cope with this 
general problem, there is still further research to be done. Thus, this paper provides a specific 
analysis of the main determinants that can explain the existence of underground economy in 
the EU and how these variables might affect positively or negatively SE. Our research could 
help EU governments to better know which factors might increase shadow economy size so 
as to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to improve the situation. 
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In order to keep the subject of this paper tractable, the objective is to study exclusively the 
shadow economy in the 28 EU countries. It is expected to find differences across EU 
countries and the main purpose is to determine which variables can be meaningful and can 
explain considerably these different sizes of European Union shadow economies. As it has 
been mentioned, shadow economy size differs among EU countries; how to interpret these 
differences? What are the factors that might determine that a country has a higher percentage 
of SE than others? Has the economic crisis affected SE size, as many experts claim? Have 
some variables had a greater impact after the economic recession of 2008? In this paper, we 
will try to give answers to these questions. 
The choice of this topic can be explained by my personal desire of eradicating as much as 
possible shadow economy. To my mind, and taking into account that I have studied a degree 
of Economics, it is challenging and motivating to learn more about the possible determinants 
of shadow economy in EU countries. This study is personally appealing to me since, from 
my point of view, one way to combat shadow economy existence is to do more and more 
research on the field, these researches could explain why some countries do have a higher 
percentage of shadow economy over total GDP. Not only would countries be aware of the 
determinants that cause a higher percentage of shadow economic activities, but at the same 
time governments might be encouraged to reply policies of countries with lower shadow 
economy percentages so as to reduce the importance of this phenomenon in their economy. 
The Director of ILO’s Department of Statistics warned of the danger of having a high 
informal economy: “The high incidence of informality in all its forms has multiple adverse consequences 
for workers, enterprises and societies and is a major challenge for the realization of decent work and for 
sustainable and inclusive development.” (Diez, 2018) 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework: 
a definition of shadow economy will be provided, some methods for estimating it will be 
reviewed and detailed and the main believed factors determining SE size will be as well 
presented; in Section 3, variables and methodology employed will be described, including an 
analysis of data and the presentation of the hypotheses to be tested, the econometric model 
will be as well presented. Section 4 presents the results obtained and, finally, a discussion of 
the findings, conclusion and future research are presented at the end of the document in 
Section 5. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Concept of shadow economy 
Shadow economy is certainly something which is often discussed in today’s world. 
Underground economy, hidden economy, gray economy, cash economy, informal economy, 
black economy and shadow economy are all terms used indistinctively for this topic. 
Nevertheless, underground economy, in one form or another, has been in existence for 
centuries. As the Canadian-Indian writer Rohinton Mistry said: “Black money is so much a part 
of our white economy, a tumour in the centre of the brain - try to remove it and you kill the patient.”  
Over the years, there has been an increasing government’s concern about the importance of 
this matter and SE is believed to have decreased in the last recent years. A high percentage 
of SE activities means losing a valuable source of revenue which has undoubtedly direct 
economic, political and social implications for the overall society. Therefore, the existence 
of a significant percentage of shadow economy is a major problem that can affect the values 
of macro-magnitudes such as income per capita, which is used as a reference for the 
distribution of international aid funds and, therefore, can damage the design of economic 
policies that are based precisely on these magnitudes. Additionally, shadow economy leads 
to unfair competition between employers; tax evasion leading to a decrease of state income; 
and no social security payments which imply significant long term consequences such as 
pension sustainability. (Mauleón & Sardà, 2017) 
When it comes to the definition of this phenomenon, there is not a unique worldwide 
definition. The concept of underground economy includes not only all productive illegal 
economic activities (such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering…) but it 
also includes the irregular economy. Generally speaking, it refers to all operations that remain 
hidden from the Public Administration to avoid payment of taxes, payment of Social Security 
contributions or fail to comply with labor standards or administrative regulations. A common 
definition is the following: “market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that 
escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP”. (Smith, 1994). There is another common 
definition of SE that only covers legal activities, that is, the SE is the “unreported income from 
the production of legal goods and services - either from monetary or barter transactions - and so includes all 
economic activities that would generally be taxable, were they reported to the tax authorities”. (Buehn & 
Schneider, 2017). 
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There are different types of underground economic activities. Table 1 identifies the main 
ones which can be basically divided into legal and illegal activities. Among legal activities, tax 
evasion and tax avoidance can be distinguished. Legal activities cover the purchase and sale 
of goods and services that have been legally produced, this can be the case of unreported 
income from self-employment, do-it-yourself work or employee discounts. Illegal activities 
are related with movements of goods and services that are not legal such as drug dealing, 
smuggling, prostitution or gambling. It might be highlighted the fact that the underground 
economy not only convers monetary transactions but also non-monetary ones, for instance, 
theft for own use or barter of drugs. (Buehn & Schneider, 2017) 
Table 1. Types of underground economic activities 
Source: Lippert & Walker (1997, p.5)  
Organizations such as the Organization for Economic-Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) distinguish between three different types 
of underground economic activities. In the first place, hidden production, which refers to legal 
production of goods and services that aimed to avoid paying taxes or regulations. Secondly, 
illegal production, which is based on illegal production of goods and services or products that 
have been done by fraudulent methods. Thirdly, informal production that covers the existence 
of businesses that are not registered legally. 
To finish with the definition of underground economy, it is important to differentiate 
between fiscal fraud, tax evasion and underground economy since there are different 
concepts that tend to be confused. ‘Underground economy’ covers economically legal but 
hidden practices like black work as well as certain illegal hidden activities such as trafficking 
with illicit drugs or prostitution. The first component, legal undeclared activities in the 
shadow economy, typically includes tax avoidance, although taxes could also be evaded 
pursuing different actions that are separate from those of the shadow economy, for instance, 
when the legally obtained capital income is not truthfully reported. (Buehn & Schneider, 
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2016). Therefore, shadow economy and tax fraud are not the same, despite shadow economy 
usually generates a significant loss of fiscal revenue, this is not always the case, for instance, 
one example could be the unregistered but low-income street vendors. 
Obviously, businesses and individuals decide to participate in the shadow economy because 
it has some monetary, regulatory or institutional advantages such as not to pay social security 
contributions or taxes, not to comply with legal labor market standards or avoid certain 
administrative procedures. An illustrative example of underground economy can be non-
registered businesses that avoid paying income taxes or VAT or, even more simply, 
unreported sources of incomes which are unknown to the tax administration and allow 
individuals or businesses to benefit from some untaxed income.  
However, shadow activities can be detected and a significant fine should be paid in that case. 
Indeed, governments need to have the power to reduce these shadow economy activities. 
For this reason, governments have the duty to impose significant fines to firms or people 
working in the SE. To be effective, the fines should be heavy enough to deter potential 
shadow economic activities; if they are too small, they could simply be regarded by firms and 
people as “the cost of being informal” and these fines can be ignored. This illustrates the 
responsibility of governments to impose heavy fines. More than 70 years ago, Kenneth 
Boulding (1947), an English-born American economist, already declared that “The greater the 
penalties laid on sellers in the black market... the higher the black’s market price.” So, individuals make 
a choice when deciding breaking the law and they decide to work in the SE whenever the 
benefits (the opportunity cost of being formal) outweigh the costs (probability of detection 
and potential fine). This can be reflected in the following equation: SE = SE 
[𝑝 (𝐴, 𝐹); 𝑓; 𝐵(𝑇, 𝑊)] where p is the probability of detection that in turn depends on 
enforcement actions A taken by the tax authority and on facilitating activities F accomplished 
by individuals to reduce the detection of shadow economic activities, f is the potential fine 
and B is the opportunity cost of remaining formal which in turn depend on the burden of 
taxation T and on labor costs W (Schneider, 2016). Logically, the higher the probability of 
detection p or the potential fine f, the lower the incentives to participate in the shadow 
economy, while the higher opportunity cost B, the more people are willing to take part in the 
shadow economy. Even though these factors can determine the decision of “breaking the 
law”, there are multiple determinants that do also have an influence and will be explained 
later.  
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To finish with, as it has been already mentioned and as a reminder, the existence of shadow 
economy means that the GDP is underestimated or, in other words, that the Deficit/GDP 
and Debt/GDP ratios are overestimated. Since tax revenues will be reduced, this will 
generate negative consequences in designing the fiscal system, in equity and will ultimately 
damage the fiscal sustainability of the economy. Every single fiscal or monetary policy that a 
country decides to undertake (if shadow activities do exist) will be based on biased official 
data, which will consequently imply macroeconomic policy mistakes (Ahumada et al., 2006). 
Due to these facts, there has been a growing interest in the last decades in measuring the size 
of the shadow economy and, accordingly, the public sector is especially interested in turning 
shadow economic activities into regularized work. 
2.2 Methods for estimating the size and development of the SE 
There is a wide variety of methods that are employed when desiring to estimate the size of 
the shadow economy. Logically, it is not an easy task to quantify the size of underground 
economy since people tend to hide it. A short description of the most widely used approaches 
is going to be detailed, as well as the main advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
Before doing so, it should be highlighted the fact that there is not an ideal method and results 
usually differ significantly between them. The choice of the methodology can be made per 
availability of data or research objectives. Moreover, there exists the possibility of combining 
different methods so as to increase accuracy in results. 
To begin with, it would be useful to present the following figure to have an overall picture 
of the different available methods for estimating shadow economy. 
Figure 1. Estimation methods of SE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own compilation based on data from Gestha (2014) 
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As it can be appreciated in the figure, there are basically two main types of methods: 
2.2.1 Direct methods 
Direct methods are based on surveys, tax auditing and other compliance methods, however, 
these methods usually underestimate the shadow economy since they are not representative 
of the total population. Indeed, tax auditing is not randomly made and does only show a part 
of undeclared income, leading to an underestimation of the SE. Concerning surveys, there 
are several factors that affect directly the accuracy of results, for instance, surveys’ wording, 
respondent’s willingness to cooperate and confess fraudulent behavior can significantly 
affect surveys’ results. In reality, the majority of people are not proud of working in the SE 
and they obviously tend to hide these fraudulent behaviors meaning that survey method 
results are again generally underestimated. What is more, comparisons between countries is 
complicated due to language difficulties, the different wording of each country’s languages 
can imply different meaning, misinterpretations of surveys questions and so on. 
Consequently, surveys’ results might not be consistent across various countries. (Buehn & 
Schneider, 2017)  
Despite these apparent drawbacks of direct methods, a new type of surveys that is 
increasingly being used might be commented. They are called surveys and the reasoning is 
the following: company managers should be the ones surveyed since they are supposed to 
have a better knowledge of how much business income and wages go unreported due to its 
privileged position in this matter. Accordingly, Putnins and Sauka (2015) decided to 
construct a survey whose design aimed to “maximize” the veracity of managers’ responses. 
Then, an estimation of unreported business income, unregistered workers, and unreported 
wages was obtained which help to estimate the size of the SE as a percentage of GDP. 
Despite the fact that this approach seems to be appealing, much more research is needed to 
assure its reliability.  
To conclude, although direct approaches are widely used in the real world, indirect methods 
are believed to be more reliable in terms of accuracy since they are based on macroeconomic 
variables which are correlated with shadow economy size. In the following section, most 
common and relevant approaches are going to be explained and summarized. 
2.2.2 Indirect methods 
There are different types of indirect methods. For example, discrepancy income-expenditure 
method considers the gap between the expenditure measure and the income measure of 
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GDP as an indicator of the existence of underground activities. Likewise, discrepancies in 
the labor market are believed to be an indicator of increased activity in the underground 
economy. This method considers constant labor force participation, therefore, a decrease in 
labor force participation would be accompanied with an increase in people working in the 
SE. (Schneider, 2016) Since these two methods are quite intuitive, the following lines will be 
devoted to the rest of methods that require a further explanation. 
The currency demand approach 
The currency demand approach is based on the belief that most of the informal transactions 
are made in cash so that an increase in currency demand will be an indicator of an increase 
in shadow economic activities. According to Tanzi (1983), hidden transactions are 
undertaken in the form of cash payments since it becomes more difficult to be discovered 
from the authorities. He includes in the estimation equation all factors that incentive people 
to work in the SE such as direct and indirect tax burdens, government regulation, state 
institutions and tax morale. (Buehn & Schneider, 2017). Tanzi (1983) mentions as well 
different conventional factors, such as income development, payment habits, interest rates, 
credit and other debt cards that can be substitutes for cash. So, “any “excess” increase in 
currency, or the amount unexplained by conventional factors, is then attributed to the rising 
tax burden and other reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy”. Even though 
this approach is one of the most commonly used, Garcia (1978) and Park (1979) claimed that 
increases in currency demand deposits are primarily attributed to a decrease in demand 
deposits rather than a currency rise caused by SE activities. Although this method can be 
applied to many countries, it cannot be excluded from criticism. In fact, it is true that not all 
transactions in the SE are paid in cash. Moreover, other factors such as regulations, taxpayers’ 
attitudes towards the state or tax morality are not taken into consideration and, therefore, 
hidden economy might be underestimated.  
The electricity consumption method 
The electricity consumption method is based on two different methods 
The Kaufmann-Kaliberda method consists of regarding electricity consumption as the best 
indicator of total economic activity (both official and unofficial). The elasticity of electricity-
total GDP is assumed to be close to one. Consequently, if the increase in electricity 
consumption is larger than the growth of official GDP, this can be understood as an increase 
in the participation in the shadow economy. (Kaufmann & Kaliberda, 1996). However, this 
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approach has some deficiencies since electricity consumption and shadow economic 
activities do not always come together. There are actually several alternative energy sources 
that make electricity not essential, or even sometimes it is not necessary the use of energy to 
work in the underground economy. This can be the case of personal services, for instance. 
Likewise, this method does not consider the fact that the elasticity of electricity/GDP varies 
across countries and over time, that is, is not always close to one. (Johnson et al., 1997)  
An alternative of Kaufmann-Kaliberda method is the Lackó method (1998, 1999). This 
method assumes that, in all economies, there is a part of household electricity consumption 
that is involved with no official-underground activities. As in the method explained before, 
it cannot be forgotten that there are some activities which do not require a significant amount 
of electricity and that many SE activities do not occur on households so that the electricity-
consumption methods do also have some limitations when estimating the size of shadow 
economy. 
Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach 
The MIMIC model consists of a statistical theory on unobserved (hidden) variables, which 
considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the SE measured. This approach 
pioneered by Frey & Week-Hannemann (1984) and further expanded by Schneider and his 
coauthors (2013, 2016).  The shadow economy is considered as the unobservable (latent) 
variable and the MIMIC estimation procedure is the following:  
In the first place, relationships between the latent/unobservable variable and the observable 
variables are specified through a structural model:  𝜂 = Γx + 𝜁   where η represents the 
shadow economy or the latent variable, Γ is the coefficient matrix in the structural model, x 
is the vector of causes in the structural model and ζ is the error term in the structural model 
Secondly, the unobservable variable is linked to its indicators in a measurement model, also 
called factor analytical model: y = Λy𝜂 +  𝜀  where y represents the vector of indicators in 
the measurement model, Λy is the coefficient matrix in the measurement model, η is the 
latent variable or SE, and ε is the error term in the measurement model. 
If we substitute the measurement equation into the structural equation, a new equation is 
obtained which shows the relationships between causes and indicators:    
yt = 𝜋xt + zt  where 𝜋 = Λy Γ and zt = Λy 𝜀t + 𝜁t   
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Figure 2. The MIMIC model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Buehn & Schneider (2013), p.177 
The MIMIC approach has two main goals: “(i) to estimate the relationships between a set of observable 
variables, divided into causes and indicators, and the shadow economy activity (unobservable variable); and 
(ii) to test whether the researcher’s theory or derived hypotheses as a whole fit the data.” (Buehn & 
Schneider, 2017) 
The MIMIC method offers advantages and disadvantages. This method makes possible the 
consideration of multiple indicators and multiple variables simultaneously. Additionally, the 
application of this approach allows flexibility, that is, causal and indicator variables can vary 
and are usually chosen depending on the features aimed to be studied. Nevertheless, this 
method has also some drawbacks. It is not possible to obtain absolute coefficients and it is 
at the same time difficult to distinguish causes from estimators, finally, the results are highly 
influenced by the data and specifications used. (Medina & Schneider, 2018) 
2.3 Determinants of shadow economy 
There are some drivers that might explain the existence of SE and the great discrepancy of 
SE size across countries, in fact, it is thought that these determinants might have an effect 
on SE. Before explaining these determinants that are presented in almost all academic studies 
of SE, it would be interesting to comment on a survey that reflects quite well why citizens 
decide to work in the shadow economy. The survey was done in 2013 and is called as special 
Eurobarometer survey no.402. The following question was raised to citizens: “what are in 
your opinion the reasons for doing undeclared work? and citizens asked the following: 
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Figure 3. Reasons for doing undeclared work  
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 402: Undeclared work in the European Union. 
As it can be appreciated in Figure 3, there are similarities between the reasons given by 
citizens with respect to the drivers thought in the literature as the main determinants of SE 
existence. According to citizens, unemployment, taxes and social security contributions, 
social welfare benefits, bureaucracy or regulations might influence the decision of working 
in the shadow economy. Now, a brief but concrete explanation of some of the worldwide 
accepted determinants of SE is going to be detailed: 
Tax and social security contribution burdens 
Obviously, tax and social security burdens play a great role in the existence of SE. When the 
amount of tax and social security contribution burdens is significantly large, people are more 
willing to participate in the SE. In fact, “the bigger the difference between the total labor cost in the 
official economy and after-tax earnings (from work), the greater the incentive to reduce the tax wedge and 
work in the SE.”  (Buehn & Schneider, 2017, p. 4). Therefore, countries should pay attention 
and try to control tax and social security contribution burdens in order to avoid negative 
consequences on their fiscal system.  
It might be interesting to comment some differences concerning European Union countries. 
For instance, France is the only country that takes more than half (67%) of a worker’s gross 
salary for social security contribution. Slovakia and Austria do also have large shares. 
Regarding income taxes, Denmark might be commented since despite the fact that it is the 
country with the lowest share of social security contributions, it is the country with the 
highest percentage of personal income tax (35.8%), whereas Cyprus is the one with the 
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lowest income tax rate of the total EU countries (Rogers & Philippe, 2020). As a 
consequence, both income tax and social security contributions might be considered at the 
same time to avoid misleading results. 
2.3.1 Quality of institutions or corruption 
A highly corrupt government tends to be associated with a high percentage of SE activities. 
Therefore, if individuals perceive institutions and the government itself as unfair and corrupt, 
there would be more incentives to work in the unofficial economy. On the contrary, if 
individuals consider that government policies are done pursuing the common interest of the 
whole society and public institutions are considerably fair, people would be more willing to 
remain formal. (Buehn & Schneider, 2017) 
2.3.2 Regulations 
The abundance of norms and regulations can worsen the development of official economic 
activity and may encourage individuals to work in the shadow economy. In fact, labor market 
regulations or trade barriers lead to a significant rise in labor costs, therefore, “countries that 
are more heavily regulated tend to have a higher share of shadow economy in total GDP”. (Medina & 
Schneider, 2018, p. 34) It might be highlighted the fact that it is not the overall extent of 
regulation but the enforcement which makes individuals to operate in the shadow economy.  
2.3.3 Unemployment 
In accordance with the International Labor Office (ILO) definition, “the unemployment rate is 
the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of 
people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who: - are without 
work during the reference week; - are available to start work within the next two weeks; - and have been 
actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months.”. 
It is interesting to comment unemployment since as Tanzi (1999, p. 347) declared “the current 
literature does not cast much light on these relationships even though the existence of large underground economy 
activities would imply that one should look more deeply at what is happening in the labour market” 
Therefore, although it is not clear the effect that has unemployment rate on shadow 
economy, it is initially expected that the greater the rate of unemployment, the higher the 
probability to work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. (Schneider & Williams, The 
Shadow Economy, 2013).  
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2.3.4 Productive specialization 
The weight of underground economy varies significantly across sectors, meaning that 
productive specialization of countries does play a role when analyzing shadow economy size. 
Agricultural sector and services sector are believed to be the sectors that generally 
concentrate a greater weight of SE. So, it is assumed that countries whose economies depend 
on a great extent on agriculture or services sector will have a higher share of shadow economy 
over total GDP.  
Size of the agricultural sector 
Agriculture is supposed to be one of the sectors with highest level of unregistered workers. 
Indeed, it is a sector characterized by temporary workers and lack of regular controls so that 
working in the agricultural sector, in one way or another, enable workers to participate in the 
shadow economy. Consequently, “the larger the agricultural sector, the more possibilities to work in 
the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.” (Hassan & Schneider, 2016) 
Size of the service sector 
As it has been already mentioned, the service sector due to its nature is another sector that 
is believed to have a significant influence on the participation in shadow economy activities. 
In fact, the “Federación de Organizaciones de Profesionales Autónomos y Emprendedores” 
recently stated that the sectors where most part of underground economy is concentrated 
are services such as commerce or hotel and catering industry. A study done by this 
association revealed that mechanics, transporters, taxi drivers, hairdressers, bars and 
restaurants, cleaning companies are services that are usually most affected by the black 
economy.  
2.3.5 Public sector services 
Generally, it is known that the more state revenues, the better publicly provided goods and 
services. Consequently, an increase in the shadow economy (along with a decrease in state 
revenues) will worsen the quality of public sector services. So, as state revenues’ have 
decreased due to the increase in SE activities, the government may increase tax rates so as to 
maintain state revenues. This increase in tax rates might encourage firms and individuals to 
participate even more in the shadow economy and countries will be caught in a vicious circle. 
To summarize, “countries with higher tax revenues achieved by lower tax rates should have smaller shadow 
economies”. (Buehn & Schneider, 2017, p. 5) 
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2.3.6 Tax morale 
“Tax morale measures taxpayer perceptions and attitudes towards paying and evading taxes.” (OECD, 
2019). In general, taxpayers are more willing to pay all their corresponding taxes if the tax 
system is considered as fair and honest. Cultural or social norms have an influence and people 
usually behave in accordance with these norms. The better tax morale, the more taxes the 
tax authorities will collect.  
Under-declared employment is used by employers who do not accept the formal ‘rules of 
the game’, due to their belief that the state is corrupt, or that the state does not provide them 
with the public goods they deserve given the taxes they pay. (Willians & Horodnic, 2015) 
This can be closely related with a variable that has been previously explained and does have 
an impact on shadow economy, which is quality of institutions or corruption. 
It might be interesting to comment some aspects about the special Eurobarometer survey 
no. 40299, for instance, this survey asked individuals in 2013 to classify their point of views 
about six different types of undeclared work (where number 1 represents a totally 
unacceptable behavior and number 10 represents a totally acceptable behavior). The 
following describes the citizens viewpoints about tax evasion. 
Figure 4. Acceptability of evading taxes by not or only partially declaring income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Special Eurobarometer 402: Undeclared work in the European Union 
It is widely known that there is a greater tax moral in north-west European countries 
(Finland, Sweden…) than in south-east European countries (Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania), this 
can be explained by cultural or transparency factors (Alm & Torgler, 2003; Frey & Weck-
Hanneman, 1984). Moreover, there is a negative correlation between underground economy 
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and tax morale in the European Union which is statistically significant (-0.64). (Onrubia, 
2013)  
“The higher the tax morale (i.e., the greater is the alignment of their beliefs with the laws and regulations), 
the lower the likelihood of employees participating in underdeclared employment.” (Mineva & Stefanov, 
2018, p. 35) 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to collect reliable and concrete data from tax morale from 
all the countries under study meaning that this variable cannot be included in the model. 
However, it must be born in mind the implications that tax morale of citizens has on SE. 
3. ECONOMETRIC MODELING AND DATA 
3.1 Description of data and presentation of variables 
This section explains in detail the data that is going to be used to construct the econometric 
model which particularly analyzes European Union SE and some of its determinants. That 
is, in order to make our study easier and tractable, the analysis will only cover the 28-EU 
countries. The European Union, for the years studied, is composed of 28 countries which 
are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. Likewise, countries are going to be classified in two types: 
northwest EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and UK) and 
southeast EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Spain). This classification of 
northwest and southwest EU countries would be used for the computation of Figure 5. 
Likewise, the variables that we are going to analyze in our study are the following: 
To start with, the main variable on which we are basing our study is shadow economy, the 
one used to construct Figure 5. Medina and Schneider (2018) estimate the size and 
development of the shadow economy over the period 1996 a 2015. They use the MIMIC 
method and they apply the light intensity approach, eliminating the complications that occur 
from GDP being used as a cause and indicator variable. Results reveal that the shadow 
economy has decreased from the 1990s to 2015 by 3-4 percentage points from the total 143 
countries. To execute the following analysis, these data will be used. 
18 
 
Fiscal variables are believed to be a crucial determinant for the existence of SE. The variable 
that is going to be included in the model is denominated as “taxes on labor, as a percentage 
of total GDP”. This variable appears in the report named as Taxation Trends in the European 
Union published on a yearly basis by the European Commission. Labor taxes comprises both 
taxes on employed labor income and taxes on non-employed labor income. Specifically, this 
variable includes “taxes on individual or household income including holding gains (part raised on labor 
income or on social transfers and pensions), labor wage bill and payroll taxes, compulsory employers’ and 
employees’ actual social contributions, and compulsory actual social contributions by self- and non-employed 
persons (part paid by social transfers recipients)” (European Commission, 2017, p. 248). It is 
convenient to include this variable in the model because it includes not only personal income 
tax but also social contributions, as well as social transfers that are paid by the state and 
benefits from old-age pension schemes.  
Agriculture employment rate and services employment rate are going to be used as an 
illustration of the productive specialization of the country under study. The World Bank 
defines employment as working-age people engaging in activities to produce goods or 
services in exchange of compensation. The agriculture sector consists of “activities in 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” and the service sector includes “wholesale and retail trade 
and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage, and communications; financing, insurance, real estate, and 
business services; and community, social, and personal services.” (World Bank, 2020) These variables 
are in accordance with the International Labour Organization (ILO) that classifies economic 
activity using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic 
Activities. 
Additionally, variables measuring quality of governance might be appropriate for our 
proposed model. Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2010) worked hard to construct the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, which main purpose is to measure quality of governance. 
These Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are suitable for our study since they collect 
data from the 28 EU countries throughout the years of study. Three variables are going to 
be included in the model. In the first place, regulatory quality is defined as “perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.”. It will be an indicator of the previously explained determinant 
named as ‘regulations’. Secondly, government effectiveness indicator measures “perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures”. This will be an indicator of ‘public sector services’. Last but not least, the level of 
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corruption of the desired country is going to be analyzed with control of corruption variable. 
This variable represents “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercise for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruptions, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interest”. (World Bank, 2016). This variable will be used to represent the quality of institutions 
of corruption of the specific EU country. 
The economic development of a country clearly plays a role when analyzing SE. Two 
macroeconomic variables are going to be introduced in the model: real GDP per capita and 
unemployment rate. According to Eurostat (2020), real GDP per capita is “the ratio of real 
GDP to the average population of a specific year. GDP measures the value of total final output of goods and 
services produced by an economy within a certain period of time. It includes goods and services that have 
markets (or which could have markets) and products which are produced by general government and non-
profit institutions.” Real GDP p.c.is considered as an indicator of economic activity and is often 
used as a measure for the development of material standards of living in a particular country. 
Therefore, the higher the GDP per capita, the greater rate of economic development and the 
lower the SE. On the other hand, unemployment rate is the number of people unemployed as a 
percentage of the labor force, following ILO definition. Undoubtedly, a higher unemployment rate 
denotes a weak economic growth and a higher SE, ceteris paribus. 
The following table summarizes in a clear way the definition of the variables and their 
sources. 
Table 1. Definition and source of variables 
Variables Definition Sources 
Shadow 
economy (% of 
GDP) 
Informality economy, which means those economic 
activities and income earned that circumvent 
government regulation, taxation or observation 
Medina and 
Schneider 
(2018) 
Taxes on labor 
(% of GDP) 
Taxes on individual or household income including 
holding gains, other current taxes, employers’ actual social 
contributions and households’ actual social contributions.  
European 
Commission 
(2017) 
Agriculture 
employment (% 
of total 
employment) 
Employment in agriculture, modeled by International 
Labour Organization (% of total employment) 
World Bank 
(2020) 
Services 
employment (% 
of total 
employment) 
Employment in services, modeled by International Labor 
Organization (% of total employment) 
World Bank 
(2020) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Index 
Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development 
WGI (2016) 
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Government 
Effectiveness 
Index 
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures… 
WGI (2016) 
Corruption 
Index 
Perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
WGI (2016) 
Unemployment 
rate (% of labor 
force) 
Number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
labour force. 
Eurostat (2020) 
Real GDP per 
capita (€ p.c) 
The ratio of real GDP to the average population of a 
specific year 
Eurostat (2020) 
Source: own compilation based on data from WB, Eurostat, Medina & Schneider, EU Commission  
In addition, the size of the shadow economy over total GDP varies significantly across EU 
countries. It might be convenient to take a look at the following graph, which represents the 
evolution of the mean average SE in the 28 European Union countries (blue line). Likewise, 
the green line represents average SE of the 14 northwest EU countries, while the gray line 
represents the mean SE of the 14 Southeast EU countries. For each year, the average of SE 
of the countries under study has been calculated. Obviously, the lower the SE (%) and 
consequently the lower the line drawn, the better. 
Figure 5. Evolution of mean Shadow Economy in EU countries, 2000-2015 
 
Source: own compilation based on data from Medina & Schneider (2018) 
By observing the graph, it can be stated that the importance of average SE over total GDP 
has diminished. However, it might be commented that this decreasing tendency of SE is 
21 
 
suddenly reversed, coinciding with the beginning of the economic crisis that in the EU 
exploded in 2008. The red line clearly shows this reversal and the subsequent increase of SE 
on that specific year in the three situations studied or, in other words, in all the countries of 
the European Union. However, it cannot be denied that the overall trend is without a shadow 
of doubt decreasing, which is a hopeful sign in the continuing fight of governments against 
shadow economy and tax fraud. 
As it can be appreciated in Figure 5, it is also remarkable the big discrepancy in the respective 
averages of northwest and southeast EU countries, which can be computed as the difference 
between the value represented on the grey line and the one on the green line. Apparently, it 
can be therefore concluded that there is a great discrepancy in average SE concerning 
geographical location. Nevertheless, it might be added that is not only the geographical 
location, indeed, there are many factors that do explain these discrepancies such as different 
tax morale between northwest and southeast countries, a higher GDP per capita or better 
quality of regulations in northwest Europe, in addition, northwest EU countries are usually 
the most- developed countries in EU… In fact, throughout this study, we hope to determine 
which of the previously explained variables are the most relevant determinants that affect 
significantly the percentage of SE in the European Union and help to explain this 
commented discrepancy.  
Now, it is time to clarify the specific periods of time in which our model is going to be 
detailed. For this study, the whole period of years (2000-2015) is going to be analyzed. 
Afterwards, a comparison between two different time periods, before the economic crisis 
(2000-2007) and during and after the recession (2008-2015), is going to be made. Although 
the economic crisis has apparently not affected in a great extent EU shadow economy, it is 
thought that this comparison can be useful to prove whether estimated coefficients of the 
variables studied are different between these completely different periods of time. In other 
words, it is interesting to analyze separately the evolution of SE in these two moments of 
time to prove whether there is a structural change or some relevant discrepancies among the 
determinants of SE in the European Union. In addition, although we have found relevant 
differences in SE between EU countries, the object of the study is to study all the countries 
of the European Union, so we are going to study exclusively the whole 28 EU countries 
altogether. 
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3.2 Statistical analysis 
A brief statistical analysis might be included to be aware of the type of data we are working 
with. To begin with, the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of the 
variables under study are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SE (%) 18.86 19.02 7.056 35.30 
LABOURTAXED (%) 17.26 5.085 9.100 30.80 
AGRICULTURE (%) 6.941 6.637 1.045 45.21 
SERVICES (%) 66.13 9.818 29.00 87.59 
REGULATORYQUALITY (Index) 1.200 0.4405 -0.1088 2.098 
GOVEFFECTIVENESS (Index) 1.152 0.6247 -0.3732 2.354 
CORRUPTION (Index) -1.047 0.7993 -2.470 0.4913 
UNEMPLOYMENT (%) 9.060 4.362 1.900 27.50 
REALGDPpc (€) 23,630 15,610 3,010 84,420 
Source: own compilation based on data from WB, Eurostat, Medina & Schneider, EU Commission 
It is to mention that World Governance Indicators values range from -2.5 points to 2.5 
points. More specifically, the country which is supposed to have the highest quality, 
effectiveness or corruption level is the one closest to 2.5 points.  
Zero-order correlations might also be included and are shown in Table 3. Values can range 
from -1 to 1, that is, for every positive increase of X in one variable, there is a 
positive/negative increase of zero-order correlation coefficient in the other. That is to say, 
absolute coefficients of these correlations show us the relationship strength, that is,|-0.7148| 
has a stronger relationship than 0.3784. (Bryman & Hardy, 2009) 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of variables under study 
Source: own compilation based on Gretl’s output 
The results observed in Table 3 show correlations between the dependent variable (SE) and 
the independent variables. Independent variables correlations do not give much information. 
The ones that are important for the analysis correspond exclusively to the first row. To finish 
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with the statistical analysis, scatterplots might be included. These graphs of plotted points 
give relevant clues about the relationship between SE and the independent variables and are 
represented in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Scatterplots X-Y 
 Source: own compilation based on Gretl’s output 
The interpretation of these graphs is quite intuitive. There are two main possibilities. Firstly, 
if the data show an upward pattern when moving from left to right, this means that there is 
a positive relationship between X and Y. That is, as the variables X increase (rightward 
movement), the independent variable (Y) increases as well (upward movement). The second 
possibility is a decreasing pattern when moving from left to right, this means that there is a 
negative relationship between X and Y. With this simple preliminary analysis, it can be 
appreciated how regulatory quality, government effectiveness and real GDP per capita do 
apparently have a negative relationship with respect to SE, as well that tax, agriculture, 
services, corruption and unemployment do have a positive one, as can be easily appreciated 
with the above figure. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
The aim of this research is to analyze the effect of some drivers on SE. Among the main 
contributors that lead individuals and firms to work in the underground economy, fiscal 
variables, productive specialization of the country, quality of governance and economic 
development are going to be analyzed. Based on the background information, four main 
hypotheses are going to be tested: 
In the first hypothesis, we expect that the higher the taxes on labor, the higher is the shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the bigger the taxation on official labor, the greater is the 
incentive to reduce taxes by working in the SE. 
Hypothesis 1: A higher tax burden (fiscal imposition) on labor increases SE 
The second hypothesis considers productive specialization It is thought that productive 
specialization of countries does play a role when explaining the great discrepancies in shadow 
economy size. Indeed, agricultural sector and services sector seem to generally concentrate a 
great weight of SE since the possibilities of working informal or having unregistered workers 
in these sectors is believed to be higher. So, we initially expect that the higher agriculture 
employment over total employment, the higher is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
Likewise, the higher services employment over total employment, the higher is the shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2: A big weight of agriculture and services sector in the economy increases SE 
Quality of governance might affect the decision of working in the SE. If people consider the 
government as unfair and corrupt, there would be more incentives to work in the unofficial 
economy. The same happens with regulations, for instance, government should apply 
regulations that promote economic development and growth. It is therefore expected that 
the higher quality of regulations, the lower is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. The 
higher the quality of public services, the lower is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. The 
higher the degree of corruption a country has, the higher is the shadow economy, ceteris 
paribus 
Hypothesis 3: Good quality of governance decreases SE 
It is felt that the countries which are economically more strong and, consequently, do have 
lower unemployment rates, have generally lower sizes of informal economy. These countries 
are usually more developed and therefore are supposed to have more ability to make people 
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work in the formal economy. Therefore, it is expected that the higher unemployment rate, 
the higher is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the higher the real GDP per 
capita, the lower is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher economic growth and development decreases SE 
Before ending with the hypotheses section, it would be interesting to study separately the 
results before and after the economic crisis with the two periods of time explained in section 
3.1. Undoubtedly, the recent global crisis was the worst crisis that the history of the European 
Union has had to face. Some aspects such as corruption scandals or increasing 
unemployment rates were quite often discussed in those days. Indeed, due to the economic 
crisis of 2008, unemployment rates increase dramatically since March 2008 in every single 
Member State, although this rise was not homogenous across countries. This explanation 
leads us to believe that some independent variables coefficients of the model are different 
before and after the crisis. At least, unemployment rate coefficient is supposed to be higher 
in the second period studied, as well as corruption coefficient. 
Hypothesis 5: Coefficients’ means are different before the crisis (2000-2007) and after the crisis (2008-
2015) 
3.4 Econometric model 
Taking into consideration the purpose of our study, the ideal method used is panel data since 
we have the same countries (28 members of the European Union) in which some 
determinants are studied across time (from 2000 to 2015). It is a method that combines cross-
sectional and time series issues. One advantage of the methodology used is that panel data 
“Panel data usually give the researcher a large number of data points (N, T), increase the 
degrees of freedom and decrease the collinearity between explanatory variables and thus 
improve econometric estimates”. In order to test the hypothesis, we will use a dependent 
variable which is shadow economy of every single country and different independent 
variables. Moreover, the panel has the form ti,t, i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T where i represents the 
different countries (28 in total) and t is the time dimension (16 years).  
Since there is a total of eight different independent variables to be studied, it would be 
convenient to construct different models to avoid having a misleading final picture. The 
variable which is believed to have a high influence on SE is taxation, this independent 
variable is going to appear in all the models and we will create the models according to 
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different aspects: productive specialization, quality of governance and economic 
development, our equation would be: 
Shadow economy = ƒ (fiscal variable, productive specialization, governance quality, 
economic development) 
Model 1: SEi,t = β0 + β1 TAXi,t + β2 AGRi,t + β3 SERVIi,t + εit       
Model 2: SEi,t = β0 + β1 TAXi,t + β2 REGULi,t + β3 GOVi,t + β4 CORRUPTi,t + εit 
Model 3: SEi,t = β0 + β1 TAXi,t + β2 UNEMPi,t + β3 GDPpci,t + εit 
Model 4: SEi,t = β0 + β1 TAXi,t + β2 AGRi,t + β3 SERVIi,t + β4 REGULi,t + β5 GOVi,t + β6 
CORRUPTi,t + β7 UNEMPi,t + β8 GDPpci,t  + εit 
where ∀i = 1,..., 28 and ∀t = 2000,..., 2015 
So, the main purpose behind these equations is to examine the relationship among 
independent variables and shadow economy. We try to find evidence on whether these 
independent variables have a significant positive or negative effect on shadow economy. 
These four model differ in the independent variables included, the model 4 is the most 
general one as it includes all the independent variables. Based on our models, we want to test 
whether the hypotheses explained before are true or not. Therefore, with respect to the 
parameters or coefficients to be estimated, it is expected that the signs are those presented 
in the table below.  
Table 4. Expected signs of coefficient parameters 
  β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 
Model 1 + + +           
Model 2 + - - +         
Model 3 + + -           
Model 4 + + + - - + + - 
Source: own compilation 
The reasoning is the following. Notice that throughout the paper, it has been assumed that 
the higher the taxation on labor, the higher SE; the higher the agriculture employment rate, 
the higher SE; the higher the service employment rate, the higher SE; the better regulatory 
quality, the lower SE; the better quality of public service, the lower SE; the higher corruption, 
the higher the SE; the higher the unemployment rate, the higher SE; and the higher the GDP 
per capita, the lower the SE. All this statements are done considering other things equal. 
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4. RESULTS 
Results are going to be presented below. As a reminder, panel data is going to be used as we 
have the same 28 EU countries that are analyzed over the 16 different periods (2000-2015). 
This panel data model enables the observation of the selected periods in several periods and 
therefore provides a more precise result. Observations are independent from each other and 
it is widely known that any variable that is constant overtime is out of this analysis. 
Our estimated panel data model assumes the usual panel data model’s assumptions: (i) there 
is no evidence to believe that the exogeneity property will not be fulfilled; (ii) the explanatory 
variables are independent and identically normally distributed; (iii) for each t, the expected 
value of the idiosyncratic error, given the explanatory variables in all periods and the 
unobservable effect, is zero: E(uitxi|ai)=0; (iv) each explanatory variable changes over time 
(for at least some i) and there is no perfect linear relationship between explanatory variables; 
and (v) differentiated errors variance, conditional on all the explanatory variables, is constant: 
Var (∆uit|xi)=σ
2, T=2,….T. (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 478-480)  
It is about time to start with the presentation of the results of the four different models. In 
every model, the Durbin-Watson values, which measure the degree of autocorrelation 
between the corresponding residual to each observation and the previous one, are closed to 
0 which mean a possible presence of autocorrelation. To overcome autocorrelation problem, 
there are many ways to deal with this autocorrelation detected. However, a widely-used 
method to avoid autocorrelation is going to be used, that is, a first difference to all variables 
included in the models might be added, this procedure is applied to all models. First 
differences represent the increase or decrease of variables by computing the difference 
between each data item and the previous one. Therefore, the first panel data which 
corresponds to year 2000 will be logically lost. The first initial results, without adding first 
differences, are not meaningful due to the problems mentioned but they are presented in the 
appendix so as to appreciate the Durbin-Watson values as well as the rest of the results 
obtained. The next table presents the results of the four models under study after having 
added the first difference, Durbin-Watson values have now more sense, as can be appreciated 
below. 
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Table 5. Summary of empirical results  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
const −0,451295*** −0,269935*** −0,201246*** 0,242294*** 
d_TaxesonLabor/GDP 0,406008*** 0,455438*** 0,269156*** 0,313487*** 
d_Agriculture employment rate 0,443903***     0,23601*** 
d_Services employment rate 0,496935***     0,118781* 
d_RegulatoryQuality da −0,956075   0,115248 
d_GovernmentEffectiveness c  0,173408   -0,338592 
d_Corruption f 1,24708**   1,00611** 
d_Unemployment rate f   0,311865*** 0,29177*** 
d_RealGDPpc f h −0,0002701*** −0,000194*** 
       
Fixed vs. Random Effect FE FE FE RE 
R-square 0,28251 0,147255 0,42845 0,44344 
Durbin-Watson 1,862046 1,822419 1,835161 1,831428 
Hausman test 0,0297903 0,0143693 0,023846 0,0567281 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 Source: own compilation from data based on Gretl’s output 
After having applied first differences and based on the results of our models, the different 
tests show that the AR (1) have no evidence of autocorrelation at 1%, 5%, 10% significance 
levels. Additionally, these results are in line with the literature. The estimated coefficients 
have the expected sign, with the exception of regulatory quality coefficient in model 4 and 
government effectiveness coefficient in model 2 but both of them are not statistically 
significant. 
Due to the fact that we do not have found contradictory results among these four models, it 
might be convenient to explain in a deeper way just Model 4 procedure and results. The 
reasons are the following: model 4 contains all the independent variables under study and it 
also has the higher R-square value. This represents the % variation in the dependent variable 
which is explained by the independent variables. The whole process that has been followed 
(for each model) with the corresponding steps is going to be explained in the following lines. 
For model 4, as mentioned before, we estimate shadow economy depending on tax burden, 
agriculture employment rate, services employment rate, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness, corruption, unemployment rate and real GDP per capita: 
SEi,t = β0 + β1 TAXi,t + β2 AGRi,t + β3 SERVIi,t + β4 REGULi,t + β5 GOVi,t + β6 CORRUPTi,t 
+ β7 UNEMPi,t + β8 GDPpci,t  + εit  where ∀i = 1,..., 28 and ∀t = 2000,..., 2015.  
Table 6 shows the initial results of model 4 before applying first differences. 
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Table 6. Initial results of model 4  
  FIXED EFFECTS 
  Coefficient p-value 
const 32,0526 7,13e-025*** 
TAXATION 0,325804 1,24e-05*** 
AGRICULTURE 0,331844 1,05e-07*** 
SERVICES -0,305096 9,09e-012*** 
REGULATORYQUALI 1,044 0,0806* 
GOVEFFECTIVENESS -1,28684 0,0047*** 
CORRUPTION 0,861952 0,0849* 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0,345944 4,15e-022*** 
REALGDPpc -0,0001246 0,0174** 
R-squared 0,969814   
Durbin-Watson 0,589435   
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 Source: own compilation from data based on Gretl output 
As can be appreciated in table 6, the R-square takes a very high value: 0.969814, which means 
that variables might be stationary since variables have significant tendencies over time. 
Durbin-Watson value might also be analyzed. This value measures the degree of 
autocorrelation between the corresponding residual to each observation and the previous 
one. Since the value is closed to 0 (0.589435), it might be commented the possible presence 
of autocorrelation. To overcome autocorrelation problem, first differences are going to be 
added. In table 7, the results of fixed and random effects for model 4, after applying first 
differences, can be observed. 
Table 7. Results of model 4 (after applying first differences) 
  FIXED EFFECTS RANDOM EFFECTS 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
const -0,246301 2,99e-05*** 0,242294 2,07e*0,5*** 
d_TAX 0,272528 0,011*** 0,313487 8,48e-05**** 
d_AGRICULTURE 0,168754 0,0210** 0,23601 0,0006*** 
d_SERVICES 0,12043 0,0604* 0,118781 0,0548* 
d_REGULATORYQUA 0,207952 0,678 0,115248 0,8147 
d_GOVEFFECTIVENESS -0,143718 0,7331 -0,338592 0,4105 
d_CORRUPTION 0,993024 0,0434** 1,00611 0,0352** 
d_UNEMPLOYMENT 0,277956 2,38e-013*** 0,29177 1,58e-016*** 
d_REALGDPpc -0,000237 0,0001 -0,000194 0,0008*** 
R-squared 0,44344       
Durbin-Watson 1,831428       
Hausman test       0,0567281 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10  Source: own compilation from data based on Gretl output 
As a result, after applying first differences to the model variables, the results shown in Table 
7 are a R-square value of 0.443440 and a value for the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.831428, 
which leads to the conclusion that there is no autocorrelation problem. In other words, the 
R-square value (0.443440) makes more sense than the one obtained previously (0.969814). 
The Durbin-Watson value (1.831428) is checked to discard the presence of autocorrelation. 
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As the value is closed to 2, there is not an autocorrelation problem between the disturbances. 
The model is also estimated by random effects. This model shows the corresponding 
Hausman test, to confirm whether the determinants of the panel data model are more 
consistent on the basis of the fixed effects model or on the random effects model, that is, it 
is to prove whether the group-specific error is uncorrelated, according to the null-hypothesis. 
As it can be appreciated, panel data model is always estimated by either fixed effects (FE) or 
random effects (RE). Then, basing our decision on Hausman’s test, one model or another is 
chosen, the decision is based on the following hypothesis: 
H0: the specific error is not correlated (random effects) 
H1: otherwise 
So, to decide which model might be applied to interpret the results obtained, the Hausman 
test value might be studied. In this case, it is 0.0567281(>0.05), so the null hypothesis is not 
rejected and the estimates has consistency in random effects. The results of Model 4 are 
going to be explained in more detail, but before doing so, the general interpretation for the 
β’s coefficient is the following: a 1 unitary increase in the independent variable (X) leads to a 
mean increase of β units in the dependent variable (Y), ceteris paribus. 
Concerning the results of the estimated coefficient of taxes on labour, it seems that taxation 
is an important determinant for SE in EU countries. The coefficient is statistically positive 
and significant at a 1% level, not only in Model 4 but in all the models proposed. 
Consequently, high taxes on labor might be one of the main explanations of a huge SE. In 
accordance with the results presented in table 7, a 1% increase of taxes on labor is expected 
to increase the size of the shadow economy by 0.313487%, ceteris paribus. 
With respect to the productive specialization of the country, both agriculture and services 
coefficients are statistically positive and significant, at a 1% and 10% significance level. 
Therefore, if there is a 1% increase in the employment rate, the SE will increase, in mean, 
0.236010% and 0.118781% respectively. It can be therefore stated that the higher the 
importance of these two sector in the economy, the higher the expected SE. 
Regarding the quality of governance, only the coefficient of control of corruption is 
statistically significant, at a 5% level. This coefficient is statistically positive. This implies that 
an increase of corruption is expected to increase the SE so that a 1 point increase in 
corruption index is expected to increase the size of the shadow economy by 1.00611%, 
ceteris paribus. It might be reminded the fact that World Governance Indexes take values 
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between -2.5 and 2.5 points, meaning that a 1 point increase is a considerable amount. This 
fact explains the high expected increase in SE (1.00611%) 
To finish with, variables measuring the economic situation of the country might be 
commented. On the one hand an increase in unemployment rate is expected to increase SE. 
A priori one would expect that in periods of economic recessions where unemployment rates 
increase dramatically, the public authorities are so overwhelmed that turn a blind eye and 
relax regulatory compliance controls of undeclared labor, taxes… In our model, the 
coefficient of unemployment rate is statistically significant and positive at a 1% level, so that 
an increase of 1% in unemployment rate will lead to an increase, in mean, of 0.291770% in 
SE. On the other hand, an increase in real GDP per capita is expected to decrease SE. The 
coefficient of real GDP pc is also statistically significant and positive at a 1% level, which 
means that a 1 unit (euro per capita) increase in real GDP per capita leads to a mean decrease 
of 0.000124631% of SE. It might be added the fact, although this coefficient variable seems 
to be irrelevant according to results shown in Table 7, it is not the case since if we consider 
an increase of 1000 euros per capita (which is a much more plausible comparison) increase 
in real GDP per capita, the SE will be decreased by 0.124361%. 
To sum up, it can be concluded that changes in taxation, agriculture employment rate, 
services employment rate, level of corruption and unemployment rate are expected to rise 
the percentage of shadow economy over total GDP (other things being equal), as it can be 
appreciated by the positive coefficients shown in Table 7. While changes in real GDP per 
capita are expected to decrease the percentage of SE over total GDP, ceteris paribus. 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that quality of regulation and government effectiveness are 
supposed to decrease SE percentage, in our model, these variables will not have apparently, 
an influence on the dependent variable. In the light of the results presented in the above 
table, it can be said that we have successfully proved our intuition and the first four 
hypotheses. 
It is about time to go ahead with the testing of hypothesis 5. To refresh, the formulation of 
the hypothesis was the following: Coefficients’ means are different before the crisis (2000-2007) and 
during/after the crisis (2008-2015). For testing this hypothesis, model 4 is going to be employed 
since it is the only model that includes all the independent variables. However, to study these 
two periods of time, the model is going to be split in two. Model 5 covers the data for 2000-
2007 and model 6 for 2008-2015. It is expected that, at least, corruption and unemployment 
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rate coefficients have increased its importance in times of economic recession. Results are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 8. Results of model 5 (2000-2007) and 6 (2008-2015) 
              2000-2007             2008-2015 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
const -0,0052166 0,9588 -0,224916 0,0119** 
d_TAXATION 0,309892 0,0057*** 0,210993 0,0991* 
d_AGRICULTURE 0,117996 0,1386 0,178271 0,2684 
d_SERVICES 0,062185 0,3913 0,154526 0,1492 
d_REGULATORYQUALI -0,283241 0,6418 1,13597 0,1607 
d_GOVEFFECTIVENESS -0,160677 0,7231 -0,343937 0,6672 
d_CORRUPTION 0,000105 0,9998 1,55591 0,0726 
d_UNEMPLOYMENT 0,17816 0,0049*** 0,265933 1,99e-06*** 
d_REALGDPpc -0,000637 5,61e-06*** -0,0002526 0,0028*** 
R-squared 0,529602   0,476502   
Durbin-Watson 1,566765   1,545789   
Hausman test h 0,0000547   0,162644 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 Source: own compilation from data based on Gretl output 
By observing Table 8, it can be said that all coefficients have changed in value, but not in 
sign. A structural change can lead to large predictive errors and unreliability of the model in 
general. Luckily, there is no evidence in our model of structural change, i.e. we have not 
detected a structural breakdown throughout the observations. The variables which 
undoubtedly have increased its importance are corruption and unemployment, in line with 
our initial expectations. The coefficient of corruption of model 5 is not statistically 
significant, meaning that the comparison is not possible. However, if we compare corruption 
coefficient for the whole period (2000-2015) is notably smaller (1.06111) than the one 
referring to period 2008-2015(1.5591). If we study unemployment coefficient, the coefficient 
value for the second period is almost doubled, from an increase of 0.17816 % in SE to an 
increase of 0.265933% in SE. 
5. CONCLUSION 
To begin with, the main objective of the study was to analyze deeply European Union 
shadow economies. We have tried to explain the concept of shadow economy, starting from 
its definition and existing methods for estimating it, we have detailed the main drivers 
determining SE and finally we have tried to prove evidence on whether some of them do 
play a role in EU shadow economies. For this purpose, a database has been constructed 
which compiles shadow economy estimates, taxation, sector’s employment rates, variables 
determining governance’s quality and macroeconomic variables. If the initial hypotheses are 
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reviewed again, it can be seen that the different determinants proposed are effectively 
supposed to change shadow economy size. All the topics contemplated at the beginning of 
the paper have been successfully covered and unsurprisingly the results obtained are in line 
with recent literature. Indeed, the conclusions that have been drawn are the following: 
Firstly, northwest and southwest EU countries do certainly behave in a different way. It has 
been proved that northwest EU countries have a significantly lower average SE, in 
comparison with southwest EU countries. It has also been demonstrated the negative trend 
of overall EU underground economy in the period studied, which is a quite positive finding. 
Secondly, it has been checked whether fiscal imposition increase SE size. After including 
taxation of official labor in the four models proposed, it was found that tax burden is a clear 
determinant for SE in EU countries. That is, the bigger the taxation on official labor, the 
greater is the incentive to reduce taxes by working in the SE, meaning that high taxation on 
labor might be a reasonable explanation of a huge underground economy.  
The next hypothesis to be tested concerned the productive specialization of the country. 
Both agriculture and services estimated coefficients have been statistically positive and 
significant, meaning that the higher the importance of these two sectors (especially, 
agriculture) in the economy, the higher the expected SE, ceteris paribus. 
Quality of governance was expected to determine shadow economy size. It has been 
demonstrated that the more corrupt a country is, the higher expected SE, ceteris paribus. In 
other words, an increase of corruption is expected to increase the underground economy. 
Nevertheless, no evidence indicates that regulatory quality and government effectiveness 
(public services’ quality) decrease SE, at least in our proposed model. Questioning these 
results, we can think about the need for further research of better variables measuring 
governance’s quality.  I am frankly convinced that quality of regulations and quality of public 
services do play a role in EU shadow economies. Probably, the lack of a complete and 
appropriate variable measuring these topics could be one of the causes that leads to these 
adverse outcomes. 
Last but not least, it has been tested whether the economic situation of a particular EU 
country might influence SE size. Towards this end, two widely known macroeconomic 
variables have been used. On the one hand, we have obtained that an increase in 
unemployment rate increases expected SE, likewise, it has been proved that an increase in 
the real GDP per capita, decreases expected SE, other things being equal.  
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The implications are also relevant as the results suggest that a reverse change of policies (and 
accordingly determinants) might help to reduce significantly SE size. The first step that EU 
countries should follow would be to increase the consciousness on how important shadow 
economy is and what determinants do interfere in its existence, and this paper might shed 
light in this sense. 
Given the role of shadow economy in the actual EU countries, it would be of great interest 
to study the influence of other variables. There are nonetheless many different topics that 
are out of this paper and would be interesting to review. For example, the analysis could be 
completed by studying how tax morale affects these results or it would be interesting to study 
the evolution of cash usage and its relation with underground economy. As mentioned some 
lines above, it might be interesting to continue the research of the impact that suitable 
regulations and better public services would have on shadow economy. Likewise, it cannot 
be forgotten that SE plays a big role in a country of the characteristics of Spain. It could also 
be interesting to study why underground economy changes so much depending on the 
country and why northwest countries do usually have a lower proportion of shadow 
economy over total GDP 
As an open question for future research, it might be interesting to study the influence of 
Covid-19 on shadow economy size. Undoubtedly, the European Union has been seriously 
affected by Covid-19. It would be of great curiosity to verify whether this new crisis will lead 
to an increase or decrease of shadow economy. On the one hand, many businesses have 
stopped accepting cash, so the amount of cash in the economy is expected to decrease with 
this new scenario. A priori, this leads us to think that informal workers and businesses will 
have more difficulties since they are no longer allowed to operate with this form of payment. 
In principle, this should lead to a lower shadow economy. On the other hand, one opposite 
effect of the coronavirus might be a greater sense of impunity since, for instance, labor 
inspectors cannot carry out their normal work and inspections during the ‘state of alarme’, 
meaning that many businesses can continue hiring informal workers without fear of being 
caught. In effect, the high demand of the agriculture on these days, together with a lower 
number of inspections, can result in a higher number of unregistered workers. We cannot 
forget that this sector is closely related with the existence of underground economy, as it has 
been proved in our study. To finish with this, I feel obliged to comment on the great damage 
that the phenomenon of underground economy causes in the population. For example, in 
these difficult times, many women that work in the domestic service will not be able to justify 
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their cessation of activity and will not receive any assistance or aid, all because of their 
informal situation. 
My feeling is that, when a country does show a huge percentage of shadow economy, the 
responsibility should fall to the government. Governments should focus their attention on 
ways to improve the situation and launch adequate policies to ensure that people prefer 
working in the formal economy. For doing so, it is essential to provide adequate information 
to the overall population to raise awareness of the importance of remaining formal and its 
corresponding benefits. These policies would undoubtedly bring a number of benefits to 
countries.  
The recent sanitary crisis makes the regulatory compliance controls more important than 
ever so as to avoid an explosion of underground economy. In the case of Spain, it seems 
obvious that there is not sufficient staff to control fraud practices. I am firmly convinced 
that Spain should commit itself to achieve a considerable reduction of this percentage as it 
means significant yearly losses in state revenue. If Spanish population and the government 
itself alike were to work together and reduce this percentage, it would make Spain a fairer 
place to live. I would like to end my project with this reflection: "The most desperate thing 
for a society is the doubt that living honestly is useless"  
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7. APPENDIX 
  
 
                       
  NUMBER COUNTRIES   NUMBER NORTHWEST   NUMBER SOUTHEAST      
  1 Austria   1 Austria   1 Bulgaria      
  2 Belgium   2 Belgium   2 Croatia      
  3 Bulgaria   3 Denmark   3 Cyprus      
  4 Croatia   4 Estonia   4 Czech Republic      
  5 Cyprus   5 Finland   5 Greece      
  6 Czech Republic   6 France   6 Hungary      
  7 Denmark   7 Germany   7 Italy      
  8 Estonia   8 Ireland   8 Malta      
  9 Finland   9 Latvia   9 Poland      
  10 France   10 Lithuania   10 Portugal      
  11 Germany   11 Luxembourg   11 Romania      
  
12 Greece  12 Netherlands  12 
Slovak 
Republic      
  13 Hungary   13 Sweden   13 Slovenia      
  14 Ireland   14 United Kingdom   14 Spain      
  15 Italy                  
  16 Latvia                  
  17 Lithuania                  
  18 Luxembourg                  
  19 Malta                  
  20 Netherlands                  
  21 Poland                  
  22 Portugal                  
  23 Romania                  
  24 Slovak Republic                  
  25 Slovenia                  
  26 Spain                  
  27 Sweden                  
  28 United Kingdom                  
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
40 
 
 
 
3 Go
ver
n 
C
O
N
CL
US
IO
N 
ments 
should 
focus 
2 Go
ver
n 
C
O
N
CL
US
IO
N 
ments 
should 
focus 
their 
attenti
on on 
ways to 
improv
e the 
situatio
n 
If 
attemp
ts were 
made 
to 
address 
the 
proble
m 
41 
 
 
 
 
5 Go
ver
n 
C
O
N
CL
US
IO
N 
ments 
should 
focus 
their 
attenti
on on 
ways to 
improv
e the 
situatio
n 
If 
attemp
ts were 
made 
to 
address 
the 
proble
m 
4 Go
ver
n 
C
O
N
CL
US
IO
N 
ments 
should 
focus 
